Writing in the Straits Times, Zhang Zuqian makes some surprising observations about China’s relationship with North Korea and seems to suggest that it would be easier for China to cut Pyongyang loose than some people believe. As the director of European Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Zhang might be in a position to shed some light on official Chinese thinking.

The Straits Times requires registration to read articles. I went through the process and still couldn’t find the article on-line, so I’ll summarize the main points here.

Zhang begins by claiming that China can no longer be criticized for being soft on North Korea after a Chinese envoy’s visit last month caused North Korea to back down from its suspension of participation in the six-party talks. While he notes that the message from President Hu Jintao was surely delivered in diplomatic language, it boiled down to this: North Korea’s nuclear activities compromise China’s vital interests, including security. Come back to the talks, or else.

He mentions the assertion by the South Korean ambassador to Beijing that if China were to block three of the limited number of roads linking it to North Korea using maintenance as a fig leaf, the situation would change for the better. In reply, the Chinese ambassador to Seoul publicly stated that economic measures could be used to exert pressure on the North.

The most refreshing part of Zhang’s article is his rejection of the three aspects of conventional wisdom holding that the Chinese would be loath to see a North Korean collapse. The first is that politically, some in Beijing would be unwilling to lose Pyongyang as an ally. Zhang retorts that since the economic reforms of the 70s, China has undergone fundamental changes that make its relationship with the West more important than its ties to North Korea. He asks: “Why should China still think of North Korea as an ally?”

The second aspect is the Chinese fears that a unified Korea governed by the South Korean system would allow the U.S. to deploy troops near China’s border. Zhang dismisses this in a few sentences. He says there is “hardly any possibility” this will happen. He explains that the U.S. doesn’t need to be close to China to strike because of American capability to project military force from long distances. Further, he doubts the Americans would expose its troops to a Chinese attack by placing them near the border. Finally, he says that few Americans would seriously consider fighting Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula again.

The third aspect is the anticipated exodus of refugees from North Korea to China in the event of a North Korean collapse. Zhang admits this would happen, but thinks it would only be temporary. He notes that living conditions in China are still much poorer than in South Korea, and most North Korean refugees would head there as soon as they got the chance. He also thinks the international community would be willing to provide humanitarian aid and shoulder some of the burden. He sums up by saying, “Just as China survived the impact of the breakup of the former Soviet bloc 15 years ago, a more prosperous China now can manage a negative impact from a collapse of North Korea.”

If Zhang is familiar with the thinking of Chinese leadership, it might well foreshadow a satisfactory resolution of the standoff on the peninsula.